Financial sector ups and downs and the real sector in the open economy:
Up by the stairs, down by the parachute

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Abstract*

We examine how financial expansion and contraction cycles affect the broader economy through their impact on real economic sectors in a panel of countries over 1960–2005. Periods of accelerated growth of the financial sector are more likely to be followed by abrupt financial contractions than are periods of slower financial sector growth. Sharp fluctuations in the financial sector have strongly asymmetric effects, with the majority of real sectors adversely affected by contractions, but not helped by expansions. The adverse effects of financial contractions are transmitted almost exclusively through the financial openness channel, with precautionary foreign exchange reserve holdings serving as a key buffer.

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1. Introduction and overview

The risks associated with premature liberalization and external integration of the financial sector in emerging markets have been known at least since the documentation of the Southern Cone experience by Díaz-Alejandro (1985). However, the subprime mortgage crisis which began in 2006 in the U.S. and then morphed into the Great Recession of 2008–09 shows that financial systems even in the advanced economies are vulnerable to financial spillovers. Notably, Philippon (2008) shows that the U.S. crisis was preceded by a massive and unprecedented expansion of the financial sector between 2002 and 2007. He does not find an explanation for this expansion based on the needs of the corporate sector, although as others have pointed out, this may be because of the rise of household borrowing in connection with subprime mortgage loans combined with moral hazard and excessive risk-taking.

The point emerging from the above is that one way to better understand the wider implications of financial sector expansions is in terms of their impact on the growth of the real sector, which is where the social costs and benefits ultimately reside. For example, the authors of the 2010 Squam Lake Report (French et al. 2010) on fixing the U.S. financial sector note (p. 26) that "…effective financial regulations require that politicians, and ultimately, the public, have an adequate understanding of the financial system. The political turmoil surrounding the Crisis suggests the importance of disseminating expert knowledge about finance to a broader audience …" A starting point of conveying such understanding in order to gain support for regulatory reform is the analysis of the links between the financial sector and growth in the non-financial sector. This paper contains such an analysis, looking at up to 8 non-financial sectors in up to 28 countries over 1960–2005.

Real GDP growth is used frequently as a first order approximation of welfare gains. This induces us to use the value added of each sector as a proxy for its flow contribution to economic activity. As a key role of financial services is to support economic growth, our econometric specification accounts for the marginal contribution of lagged growth of financial services to the growth of other sectors, all measured in terms of their value added. The analysis focuses on the symmetry/asymmetry patterns of financial deepening cycles (slower increases, more abrupt collapses). The presence of what Rajan (2006) dubbed the "hidden tail risk" manifests itself in negative skewness and high degree of kurtosis in the real growth rate of the financial sector. Time series dynamics point to an endogenous origin of fatter negative tail in financial sector value added growth: a higher rate of financial sector growth relative to GDP raises the likelihood of future financial contractions. Given the negative skewness and "fat tail" feature of financial sector growth rates, we pay special attention to the asymmetric association between rare *sharp* financial expansions and contractions and the growth rates of the various sectors.

The present paper is unique in three ways: first, we focus explicitly on the determinants and the subsequent impact of "rare" events in financial sector development on the real economy. We identify financial sector shocks using two methodologies. The first is based on a band-pass filter where turning points in the cyclical component of value added series are identified. The second approach is based on identifying structural breaks in the growth rate of financial sector value added. We find that cycles in financial sector value added Granger-cause non-financial sector cycles with a negative sign.

Second, we analyze the impact of financial sector boom-bust cycles on different real economic sectors, allowing us to identify the ones that are most vulnerable. The empirical model is an extension of Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011), who use a regression specification that accounts for long-run convergence in growth rates to the unobserved potential level. We exploit the cointegrating relationship between determinants of long-run growth and contemporaneous level of productivity in each sector (as measured by real value added per worker) to control for the concavity (i.e. convergence) in the flow contributions to growth of the real sectors. Since the linear combination of macro variables is stationary, the estimates of the impact of financial sector shocks on the growth process of the real economy should be unbiased. Overall, all sectors except for mining and public utilities are affected by sharp contractions in the financial sector within 1 year. The construction sector is the most sensitive. In contrast, virtually none of the sectors are affected by sharp expansions of the financial sector.

Third, we examine how the adverse effect of financial sector shocks is amplified/mitigated by a country's financial openness and holdings of international reserves. We find that the adverse effect of financial contractions on the real economy works through the financial openness channel. However, the stock of reserves mitigates the adverse growth effects of financial busts. The non-linear impact of reserves is most prominent in the sectors identified as most vulnerable to financial contractions: for the construction sector, a 1 percentage point higher reserves-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 0.2 percentage point higher value added growth rate on average, but a 2.8 percentage point higher growth rate in times of financial contraction, hence partially offsetting the effect of financial contractions. The negative impact of financial openness and the offsetting positive effect of the stock of foreign exchange reserves are magnified during particularly large financial contraction episodes.

The paper is related to three strands of literature. The first strand constitutes recently emerged literature, such as Aikman, Haldane and Nelson (2010) and Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012), that focuses on the cyclical behavior of the financial sector.

The second strand studies the association between financial deepening and growth and the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Related papers include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Do and Levchenko (2007), Tong and Wei (2011), and Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall (2011). The latter authors in particular find that economic downturns tend to be more severe following financial

turmoil associated with banking distress. Our results remain significant when controlling for banking crises as well as currency crises, suggesting that it is capital account openness, rather than the origin of the shock per se, that contributes to the severity of economic downturn to follow. More recently, Aizenman and Sushko (2011a, 2011b) examine how financial development and capital flows interact with external financial dependence of firms to contribute to their market values and growth. In a growth regression framework, Cheung, Dooley and Sushko (2012) use a battery of cross-sectional and time-series regressions to show that the link between investment and growth has weakened over time and that investment in high income countries is more likely to have a negative effect on growth. Similarly, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) find that in advanced economies a fast-growing financial sector can be detrimental to aggregate productivity growth.

Finally, the present paper relates to the literature on international capital flows and emerging markets' exposure to the risk of capital flight and sudden stops (see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), and Hutchison and Noy (2006)). In particular, we provide further empirical support in favor of precautionary foreign exchange reserve holdings by emerging markets, complementing Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2012). While precautionary accumulation of reserves has been a widespread self-insurance tool among emerging market economies during our sample period, more recently preventative tools, such as macroprudential policies, and international liquidity assistance arrangements, such as foreign exchange swaps between central banks, have been increasingly employed as well (see CGFS (2011) for a comprehensive review of such policy responses and their rationale). Yet, given our sample choice, we leave the analysis of this wider array of policy measures to future research.

Section 2 overviews the data. Section 3 examines cyclical dynamics and asymmetries in the growth rate of financial sector value added; it also outlines the methodology for dating expansion and contraction episodes. Section 4 conducts a panel regression analysis of the impact of financial contractions on the real sector and the transmission channels. Section 5 concludes.

2.   Data

We obtain annual data on real value added and employment in 10 broad economic sectors covering a panel of 28 countries constructed by Timmer and de Vries (2009) through Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC), 10-Industry Database (http://www.ggdc.net). The data cover the years 1947 through 2005; however, up to 1949 data are available on only 4 countries, with the coverage jumping sharply to 26 in 1950 and to 28 in 1960. The 10 sectors are: agriculture; mining; manufacturing; public utilities (electricity, gas, and water); construction; wholesale and retail (including hotels, restaurants); transport, storage, and communication; community, social, and personal services;

government services; and finance, insurance, and real estate. Previous studies using the GGDC data include McMillan and Rodrik (2011). Following these authors, we increase the level of aggregation to 9 sectors by combining the data on community, social, and personal services with government services, because a number of countries, especially in Latin America, do not distinguish between the two when reporting employment or value added. We refer to the consolidated sector collectively as government.[1] In the bulk of the analysis, we focus only on the impact of financial sector shocks on 7 private non-financial sectors.

Table 1 [about here]

Table 1 shows pairwise correlation statistics for sectoral growth rates. The highest degree of contemporaneous correlation is observed between the public utilities and financial sectors, followed by the construction and financial sectors (with correlation coefficients of 0.84 and 0.66 respectively).

The additional controls, including real GDP per capita, domestic credit, inflation rates, real interest rates, and the agricultural and industrial shares of the economy, were obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Political stability, rule of law, and regulatory quality indicators were obtained from the World Bank Governance Indicators database (http://www.govindicators.org) from indexes constructed by Kaufmann et al (2009). Data on government consumption as a share of GDP and annual value of imports and exports as a share of GDP were obtained from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten (2009)). We construct de-facto financial openness measures using the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as the ratio of the sum of total financial assets and financial liabilities to GDP. Finally, we relied on Calvo and Reinhart (2000) to construct banking crises and currency crises.[2] Due to data availability, only regressions that include a complete control vector can be conducted on a cross-section consisting of 23 countries.

3.   Financial cycles and abrupt contractions

The focus on financial sector expansions and contractions necessarily assumes the existence of the so-called "financial cycle," with booms and busts possibly leading to serious consequences for the real economy. This section examines the cyclical dynamics in financial sector value added. We then

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[1] As Timmer and de Vries (2007) point out, some activities in government services are nevertheless traded through markets. For example, many personal services, but also private education and health services, should be part of "market services". Government services may also include value added from public investment projects. However, the data are not detailed enough to distinguish market from non-market in these sectors.
[2] The period from 2000 through 2005 represents a time of stable economic growth in most countries in our sample, also known as the "Great Moderation" (Stock and Watson (2002)). The exception to this is Argentina, where a crisis lasted from 1999 through 2002.

use two methodologies to date the incidences of shocks to the financial sector. One is based on turning points in the cyclical component of the series (identified using a frequency filter) and the other is based on structural breaks in the series (identified using a unit root test). Section 4 then proceeds to estimate the impact of financial sector shocks on the real sectors.

Following recent literature such as Aikman, Haldane and Nelson (2010) we use a frequency filter to extract the cycle component in the value added of each sector. We apply the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it to range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years (the frequency found to capture the duration of the financial cycle better when measured by credit; see Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012)). Figure 1 (top panel) shows the results using Argentina as an example. Comparing the cycles in financial sector value added with the non-financial sector total (the sum of logs of the other series, excluding government), it appears that financial sector cycles are more volatile and that volatility has been increasing over time.[3]

Figure 1 [about here]

Table 2 presents the results of Granger-causality regressions based on 1-lag specification. The table shows the results in a panel setting, using both fixed effects and country dummies. The two left columns show results in levels of the filtered series while the two right columns show regression results in first differences. The coefficients on lagged deviations from trend in financial sector value added are negative in all four specifications and statistically significant at 10 percent or better in three out of four cases. The negative association between financial sector expansions and future real sector contractions is robust to controlling for lagged real sector growth. Positive coefficients on the lagged dependent variable, in turn, indicate that expansions and contractions of the real sector tend to be fairly persistent.[4]

Table 2 [about here]

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[3] Results for total non-financial sector (including government) and individual real sectors have been omitted for brevity but are available upon request.

[4] Table A1 shows analogous results for time-series regressions at country level. The top panels show results in levels and the bottom panels show results in first differences. While the association between financial and real cycles differs across countries, 12 out of 15 (11 out of 16) significant coefficients on the lagged financial sector cyclical component in levels (first differences) are negative. Among advanced economies, the negative Granger-causality result is robust to both specifications in Spain, Sweden, and the U.S. Among emerging markets, the negative association holds in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.

The negative association between the cyclical component of financial sector and future real sector growth may be due to the tendency of financial sector growth to be subject to abrupt reversals, which are more likely to take place following a period of accelerated growth ('up by the stairs, down by the parachute' dynamic). This feature of asymmetric booms and busts in the financial industry was pointed out previously by Philippon (2008) for the U.S.

In order to address this possibility, we examine how greater financial sector value added growth affects the likelihood of future sharp financial contractions. Table 3 shows summary statistics for financial sector real value added growth rates (calculated as log differences of dollar amounts at 1995 prices) for each country. The mean growth rate for each country is positive; however, the series for 17 out of the 28 countries exhibit negative skewness. These countries, mostly emerging markets, are: Argentina; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong SAR, China; India; Indonesia; Italy; Korea; Mexico; the Philippines; Singapore; Sweden; Thailand; the United States; and Venezuela. In contrast, as can be seen from Table 3, countries with positively skewed financial sector growth series include mostly OECD economies. Furthermore, the average level of kurtosis is higher for countries with negative skew in the series (6.619 compared to 5.527).

Table 3 [about here]

Figure 2 illustrates the significance of the difference in the skew via a probability plot. The difference is seen in a greater degree of deviation from the normal distribution (Gaussian bell curve) in the tails of the distribution of financial sector growth rates for the subsample of countries with negative skew. The difference is substantial: for instance, an annual growth rate of minus 20 percent in financial sector real value added has 0.0 probability of occurrence under the normality, while the empirical probability in countries with positive skew is 0.1% (0.001 on the vertical axis) and an order of magnitude greater at 1.0% (0.01 on the vertical axis) in countries with negative skew. Overall, the predominance of a large number of outliers in the tails of the negative skew subsample indicates that the estimated difference in kurtosis between the two series is economically significant.

Figure 2 [about here]

Combined, the summary statistics indicate fat tails and higher frequency of occurrences of sudden declines in financial sector value added than predicted by a symmetric normal distribution, corroborating the notion that the financial industry, while growing over the long run, is subject to abrupt,

periodic contractions. Furthermore, this feature is more pronounced in emerging markets and a subgroup of developed countries, namely Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and the United States.

We use a binary choice regression methodology in order to examine whether sharp financial sector contractions are more likely to follow a period of accelerated financial sector growth. We define financial contractions (expansions) as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of the financial sector in each country (identified according to the innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test in Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes (1998)) followed by positive (negative) growth. In order to examine the impact of particularly large contractions, we reclassify as contractions only those episodes in which the fall in the growth rate of the financial sector real value added exceeded the median of all contractions in absolute value (those exceeding the sample median of a –9.34 percent drop in financial sector real value added over one year). [5] Using a probit model, for a country k we estimate the conditional probability of *LARGE* financial contractions, *FIN.CONTRACTION$_{k,t}$=1*, given the set of controls:

$$\Pr\left(FIN.CONTRACTION_{k,t} = 1 \middle| x_{k,t}, \boldsymbol{Controls}_{k,t}, \beta, \boldsymbol{\gamma},\right) = 1 - \Phi(\beta x_{k,t} + \boldsymbol{Controls}_{k,t}'\boldsymbol{\gamma}) \qquad (1)$$

where $x_{k,t} \equiv \frac{1}{n}\sum_{s=1}^{n} dlog(Fin.\ value\ added_{t-s}) - \frac{1}{n}\sum_{s=1}^{n} dlog(GDP_{t-s})$, denotes the difference of either the 3-year or 5-year average growth rate of financial sector real value added to the average GDP growth rate, one year before the contraction episode. Thus, the ratio captures the degree to which the growth rate of the financial sector exceeded the growth rate of GDP. A positive β would indicate that the likelihood of sharp financial contraction is increasing in the excess growth of financial sector relative to GDP 3 or 5 years prior. $\Phi(\ )$ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable and the vector of controls includes a currency crisis dummy and lagged logarithm of government spending 1 year prior.[6] We also repeat the exercise using a logit model, because it has the advantage of producing a better fit to the extremes of the distribution. The banking crisis dummy is dropped from the controls because it predicts the outcome of large financial contractions perfectly, that

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[5] The cutoff is given by Argentina's contraction episode in 2000, when during the onset of the crisis the annual growth rate of the financial sector fell to –9.43 percent. The Argentine crisis lasted several years; however, we are interested in the immediate impact of financial contractions on the real sector, as during the subsequent years of the crisis the channels of contagion are likely to multiply and become more complex. Moreover, only the initial phase of each crisis in our sample is characterized by a negative structural break in the financial sector growth rate, with subsequent years exhibiting either a reversal or a persistently low (or negative) growth rate, making it appropriate to rely on the quasi-event study approach employed in this paper with dummy variables for the year of structural break. Finally, to the extent that we control for currency and banking crisis years, we are able to pick up the impact of financial contractions on the real sectors in isolation and irrespective of the cause of the underlying contraction or the duration of the crisis.

[6] Under a logistical distribution: $\Phi = e^{-(\beta x_{k,t} + \boldsymbol{Controls}_{k,t}'\boldsymbol{\gamma})} / \left(1 + e^{-(\beta x_{k,t} + \boldsymbol{Controls}_{k,t}'\boldsymbol{\gamma})}\right)$

is, all large negative financial sector shocks are also accompanied by banking crises in our sample. The estimation is conducted with robust standard errors clustered by country, as several countries in the sample undergo more than one contraction episode.

Table 4 [about here]

Table 4 shows the estimation results. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) show results based on probit while columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) show results based on logit regressions, with and without lagged government spending as a control variable. The top panel calculates the excess of the financial sector growth rate relative to GDP using 3-year averages while the bottom panel uses 5-year averages. As expected, the coefficients on currency crises are highly significant, indicating a strong association with sharp contractions in financial sector growth. Despite the inclusion of the crisis dummies, the coefficients on the growth rate of financial sector relative to GDP growth preceding sharp contractions are also significant, indicating that excess financial sector growth is a strong predictor of a large subsequent contraction. Both the magnitude and the level of significance of the coefficients are higher when 3-year rather than 5-year averages are used, indicating that is it the immediate acceleration of financial sector growth that has the highest probability of resulting in a bust. This finding applies universally to a large number of developing and developed countries in our sample.[7]

Having obtained the coefficient vector, we can evaluate the marginal effect of financial sector growth accelerations on the conditional expectation of a *LARGE* financial contraction:

$$\frac{\partial E\left(FIN.CONTRACTION_{k,t}=1|x_{k,t},Controls_{k,t},\hat{\beta},\hat{\gamma},\right)}{\partial x_{k,t}} = \Phi'(-(\hat{\beta}\bar{x}_{k,t} + Controls_{k,t}{}'\hat{\gamma}))\hat{\beta}. \tag{2}$$

where the marginal contribution of each conditioning variable to the probability of *FIN.CONTRACTION$_{k,t}$=1* is estimated at the sample average of government expenditures and with the currency crisis dummy set to 1. We use coefficient estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ from probit specification (2) and logit specification (4) in Table 4 to calculate lower and upper bounds of the marginal effect of excess financial sector growth on the probability of a future financial contraction according to equation (2). The marginal effect based on the probit specification (2) in Table 4 is 0.038 while that based on the logit specification (4) is 0.043, indicating financial contractions have approximately a 4 percent greater

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[7] The statistically significant positive association between size of government spending and financial contractions may have several interpretations, including the crowding-out of private investment and deficits financed through inflationary policies; we leave these questions for further research.

probability of occurrence if during the preceding 3 years the growth rate of the financial sector value added was double that of the average GDP growth over the same period.

4. Impact of financial sector shocks on the real sectors

Our baseline regression model is based on Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011), but focuses on sectoral rather than aggregate growth rates. Let $g_{i,k,t}$ denote the real value added growth rate of sector i in country k in year t. Diminishing returns in the neoclassical growth model imply a positive convergence parameter λ such that:

$$g_{i,k,t} = \lambda \left(\frac{Y^*}{L_{i,k}} - \frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t}} \right) \tag{3}$$

where $\frac{Y^*}{L_{i,k}}$ denotes the long-run real value added per worker implicitly determined by structural parameters in the economy. The growth rate of real sectors, (3), is expected to diminish as their value added per worker converges to the latent potential level of output per worker, $\frac{Y^*}{L_{i,k}}$. Since the technological frontier in each sector in each country is unobservable, following Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) we assume that it is a function of economic fundamentals in each country. Therefore, for each sector i we estimate the following panel model with variation across k and t:

$$g_{i,k,t} = \left(\boldsymbol{\gamma}' \boldsymbol{X}_{k,t} - \delta \frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t-3}} \right) + \sum_i \emptyset_i \, g_{i,k,t-1} + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{+/-} FINSHOCK_{k,t-1} | I_{+/-} + \varepsilon_{i,k,t} \tag{4}$$

The first term (the vector of controls, $\boldsymbol{X}_{k,t}$) represents determinants of long-run growth at the country level (common to all sectors). The vector of country-level controls includes the credit to GDP ratio, de facto financial openness, the real interest rate, logarithms of GDP per capita, inflation, government spending, trade openness, and dummies for banking crises and currency crises.[8] In addition to the baseline, we consider a specification that controls for economic and institutional features of each country: the agricultural share and industry share of the economy, and indicators of political stability, the rule of law, and regulatory quality.

Following the specification in Equation (3), we also account for diminishing returns to scale. Specifically, we control for the relative proximity of an industry's output to the potential long-run level via the lagged real value added per worker term, $\frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t-3}}$. Since the dependent variable and the first term on the right-hand side are constructed using contemporaneous and up to 2nd lag real value added, we

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[8] Financial openness is defined as the sum of a country's total foreign assets and liabilities relative to GDP while trade openness is defined as exports plus imports relative to GDP.

include 3rd lag of real value added per worker in order to avoid serial correlation in the error term of regression Equation (4). Thus, the term in brackets serves as an empirical proxy for the unobserved proximity of value added per worker in each industry to the long-run level given the fundamentals of the economy.

The third term captures any persistence in the annual value added growth rate of sector i in country k as well as any feedback from lagged growth of other real sectors.[9]

The fourth term represents positive and negative shocks to financial sector value added, indexed with $I_{+/-}$. It captures perturbations due to abrupt changes in financial sector growth. The coefficients of interest are β_+ and β_-, which capture the impact of positive and negative shocks to financial sector growth (identified as either structural breaks in the growth rate or deviations from the filtered trend).

A common, although often neglected, concern in many growth regressions is that they often contain both stock and flow variables (for example credit and GDP) and variables with different time series properties (credit growth for example tends to contain a unit root whereas the growth rate of value added is likely to be stationary). This means the regression of $g_{i,k,t}$ on $X_{k,t}$ or $\frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t-3}}$ alone will yield biased results, since $g_{i,k,t}$ is I(0) whereas the repressors are I(1). Empirical specification in Equation (4) circumvents this problem by exploiting a cointegrating relationship between $X_{k,t}$ and $\frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t-3}}$. Specifically, if the linear combination of the two I(1) vectors is stationary then the residual will be I(0).[10] In a panel setting, for each industry i we test that the residual from the following fitted model is I(0):

$$\widehat{\gamma}' X_{k,t} - \widehat{\delta}\left(\frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t}}\right) - \widehat{\alpha}_k - \widehat{\theta}_k t = \mu_{i,k,t} \tag{5}$$

where $\widehat{\theta}_k$ captures the time-trend and is controlled for in one of the specifications.

Test results shown in Table A4 confirm that $g_{i,k,t}$ is stationary. Also, test results of the stationarity of the term $\mu_{i,k,t}$ in Equation (5) shown in Table A5 confirm that sectoral value added per worker is cointegrated with macroeconomic fundamentals that proxy for the technological frontier (the exception is the financial sector, which is consistent with the underlying premise of the paper that its behavior is special). The stationarity of $\mu_{i,k,t}$ indicates that our main empirical specification should yield unbiased coefficients on the financial sector shock terms. However, coefficients on macro controls,

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[9] The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) panel unit root test is used to test the null of unit root in first differences. Table A3 reports the results. The p-values indicate that the null of unit root is strongly rejected, indicating that the financial sector growth series is stationary. Furthermore, the p-values of intermediate ADF test results indicate that the null of unit root is rejected for each country in the sample in favor of stationarity.

[10] See Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) and subsequent citations for cointegration theory and testing procedures.

when taken individually, may be biased. Therefore, individual coefficients on the vector $X_{k,t}$ should be interpreted with caution.

Tables 5 and 6 report panel regression results based on Equation (4). Table 5 identifies financial sector expansions and contractions as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added while Table 6 provides a robustness check using an alternative methodology based on turning points in the cyclical components of the series. The results in Table 5 show that all sectors except for mining and public utilities are affected by sharp contractions in the financial sector within 1 year. The construction sector is the most sensitive. In contrast, none of the sectors are affected by sharp expansions of the financial sector[11]. The coefficient estimates indicate that on average financial sector contraction episodes are associated with an 11.9 percent drop in construction sector value added in the following year. The sensitivities of other sectors are considerably lower, with the estimates indicating an approximately 3 percent drop in value added in agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation in the year following a negative shock to the financial sector. The negative impact is robust to reclassifying financial sector ups and downs as turning points in the cyclical component extracted using a band-pass filter (Table 6). 6 out of 7 non-financial sectors show a significant negative response to financial contractions within 1 year, but only one sector shows a positive response to turning points leading to financial sector expansions. The lower values of coefficient estimates are consistent with the difference in the two methodologies used to identify financial sector contraction and expansion episodes: the Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes (1998) unit-root test based dating methodology (Table 5) identifies up to two largest structural breaks, whereas the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter results in as many turning points as cyclical deviations from the trend identified in the series. Figure 1 shows an illustrative example for the case of Argentina. Hence, the results reported in Table 5 capture the impact of fewer but more severe downturns and upturns in the financial sector compared to the results reported in Table 6.

Tables 5 & 6 [about here]

Consistent with diminishing marginal returns of the convergence hypothesis on which our empirical specification rests, all the coefficients on the "convergence factor" are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or higher. The estimates range from –0.039 for the transportation sector to –0.017 for the wholesale, retail and agricultural sectors.

The coefficients on banking and currency crises are negative in all the specifications; however, the sectors exhibit different degrees of sensitivity to such episodes. Currency crises have the most

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[11] These results are robust to alternative lag structures of up to 5 years.

adverse impact on construction sector growth (coefficient of –0.028), while the public utilities sector is most affected by banking crises, followed by the manufacturing sector (coefficients of approximately –0.028). The manufacturing sector is the only one that exhibits a significant negative response to banking and currency crises. The coefficients on remaining controls are generally consistent with the theory. Inflation and government spending exhibit a negative association with sectoral value added growth, while trade openness has a positive association.[12][13]

Based on regression results it is also possible to calculate the cumulative effect of financial contractions. Since Equation (4) contains a lagged endogenous variable, the cumulative effect of financial contraction on the growth rate of sector i in country k in period t can be expressed as $\hat{\beta}_i / (1 - \emptyset_i)$, where the linear impact of contractions, $\hat{\beta}_i$, is adjusted for the AR(1) structure in the regression. In addition, we estimate the cumulative impact on the aggregate real sector growth rate as the sum across all i sectors of the partial impact on each sector weighted by that sector's share in total real economy value added in country k in period t. The relative shares of each sector during financial contraction episodes are listed in Table 7. In computing the real value added shares, the financial and government sectors are excluded from the denominator. India boasted the largest share of the agricultural sector, at 53.1 percent of total real non-government sectors during the 1973 episode, followed by Latin American countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica (at 33.1 and 38.6 percent), and Asian economies such as the Philippines and Malaysia (at 27.0 and 25.5 percent). In contrast, OECD countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, as well as Taiwan, China, exhibit the largest relative shares of manufacturing sector value added, at 40.6, 41.0, and 46.4 percent respectively. The wholesale and retail sector is another important component for a number of countries under consideration, especially Latin American economies such as Costa Rica and Argentina, with relative weights of this sector at 31.7 and 28.6 percent respectively. Overall, the construction sector ranks behind agriculture, manufacturing, and the wholesale and retail sectors for most of the economies, accounting for a similar share to transportation and storage. As such, we expect the sensitivity of the construction sector to financial shocks to be dampened by its smaller size relative to other sectors, reducing the transmission of financial contractions when considering the entire real sector. The public utilities sector is the smallest in relative size for all cross-sections.

Table 7 [about here]

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[12] Data on government spending obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009), which include collective consumption of government for public good type activities, such as police (at constant prices).
[13] Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix show analogous results based on regressions that include an expanded set of controls for economic and institutional features of each country.

Table 8 shows the estimates of the cumulative impact of financial contractions on the total non-financial sector value added growth rate. The third column of Table 8 shows the actual magnitude of the financial contraction in percentage changes relative to the previous year. The fourth column shows the cumulative impact on the real sector calculated as a weighted sum of cumulative effects on individual sectors. The fifth column shows analogous estimates scaled by the size of the actual financial contraction relative to the sample mean.

Table 8 [about here]

The size of the contraction varies greatly for each episode. Latin American economies experienced some of the largest drops in financial sector growth, with Venezuela experiencing a 35.9 percent drop in 1960, Costa Rica experiencing a 55.0 percent drop in 1959, and Chile experiencing a huge 83.5 percent contraction in real financial sector value added in 1982. The Chilean episode is special because the banking crisis experienced in 1981 then morphed into a currency crisis, with financial sector contraction accelerating in 1982, potentially due to capital outflows. It then entered a third phase in 1983, when the Chilean government defaulted on its debt (see Laeven and Valencia (2012)). The structural break method we employ identifies sharp changes in the decline rate of Chilean financial sector value added in all three years. Several Asian economies also underwent large financial contractions, with Indonesia experiencing a 28.4 percent drop in 1997 during the Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, financial contractions in other – especially European – economies tended to be much smaller in magnitude. For instance, in 1951 Britain's financial sector growth rate simply declined to zero, while Sweden experienced mild contractions of 0.6 and 2.8 percent in 1975 and 1992 respectively.

Table 9 [about here]

Table 9 compares these events with well documented episodes of banking crises, currency crises, and sudden stops (eg sharp reversals in foreign financial capital inflows). Most sharp financial sector contractions appear to have taken place after the broad liberalization of international financial markets, especially in 1980s. Of the 12 post-1980 financial contraction episodes, 9 are associated with sharp reversals in foreign financial capital inflows, or "sudden stops."

Table 10 shows the coefficients from estimates repeating the regressions based on Equation (4) for the pre- and post-1980 subsamples. The results indicate that significant transmission from negative financial sector shocks (identified using the structural break method) to the real sectors is only detected in the post-1980 subsample, when significant financial liberalization took place. The results are robust

to using the turning point method (which identifies a greater number of financial sector disturbances, which are of smaller magnitude on average); these are shown in Table A8.

Table 10 [about here]

The association between the financial openness of an economy and the degree to which sharp contractions in financial sector growth translate into contractions of the real economy is investigated further in the results reported in Table 11.[14] This specification adds an interaction term between financial contractions and financial openness. Once the interaction term is included in the regressions, the coefficients on financial contraction dummies themselves become either insignificant or positive, indicating that the entire adverse effect of financial contractions on the real economy works through the financial openness channel. Again, the construction sector exhibits the highest sensitivity to financial contractions propagated through cross-border capital flows, with a coefficient of –0.233 (bottom panel of Table 9), followed by transportation (–0.156), wholesale and retail (–0.131), and manufacturing (–0.105).

Table 11 [about here]

In addition to the interaction with financial openness, the regression specification used in Table 11 includes the reserves-to-GDP ratio and its interaction with financial contractions. This extension is motivated by an extensive literature on foreign exchange reserves that points out the merits of reserve accumulation stemming from precautionary motives to mitigate the adverse effects of capital flight. The coefficients on both the linear reserves-to-GDP ratio and its interaction with financial contractions are positive – a higher reserves chest is associated with higher value added growth rates of the real sectors. Furthermore, comparing the coefficients on *Lag (reserves/gdp)* and on *Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)* in both the top and bottom panels of Table 10, the coefficients on the interaction terms are 10 to 15 times greater in magnitude. Since the interaction term captures the association between foreign exchange reserves specifically in times of financial contractions (when the *Lag financial contraction* dummy takes the value 1), this indicates that the positive effect of reserves on real sector growth is especially prominent during episodes of sharp financial contraction. This finding suggests that countries in which the severity of the financial shock is magnified by financial openness rely on foreign exchange reserves to mitigate the adverse impact of such capital flight on the real sectors. The non-linear impact of reserves is most prominent in the sectors identified as most

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[14] For brevity, the coefficient estimates on the remaining controls have been omitted from the table, as they do not vary significantly when interaction terms are included. The complete results are available upon request.

vulnerable to financial contractions: for the construction sector, a 1 percentage point higher reserves-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 0.2 percent higher value added growth rate on average, but a 2.8 percent higher growth rate in times of financial contractions (hence partially offsetting the effect of financial contractions).[15] For robustness we also use only the liability side in the stock measure, since the difficulty of rolling over a sudden stop would be reflected on the liability side rather than on the asset side. We repeated the regressions with interaction terms only using only liabilities in one specification and assets in the other. Table A9 reports the results. Both seem to matter, however the effect of liabilities is stronger during financial contractions, with greater number of sectors affected.

Figure 3 [about here]

Figure 3 illustrates the degree to which foreign exchange reserves have served to mitigate the impact of sharp financial contractions on real sector value added growth rates in financially open economies. The four panels in the figure focus on the sectors most affected by financial contractions: construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation. The figure plots the predicted contribution of financial openness (solid line) and financial openness plus reserves (dotted line) to real value added growth rates of each sector during financial contraction episodes. The predicted contribution is calculated by multiplying the coefficients from the panel regression in the full specification reported in Table 11 by the values of financial openness and the reserve-to-GDP ratio (conditional on the financial contraction dummy taking the value of 1).[16] As the panels for all sectors show, a rise in financial openness is associated with much greater contractions of the real value added growth rate in the four sectors during years following sharp contractions in the financial sector. The association is steepest for the construction sector (with a decline of over 50 percent predicted in the most severe case of Indonesian contraction in 1998) followed by the transportation sector (with a decline in Indonesia exceeding 30 percent). These represent counterfactual predictions holding

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[15] Regression coefficients on financial openness and the reserves-to-GDP ratio have different interpretations because of the way the data have been normalized: the reserves-to-GDP ratio is in integer percentage points (a 1 unit increase in the variable represents a 1 percentage point rise) as in the WDI database, whereas other variables are in decimal percentage points (a 1 unit increase in the variable represents a 100 percentage point rise). The coefficient of 0.028 on interaction with the reserves-to-GDP ratio indicates that 1 percentage point higher reserves relative to GDP during contractions is associated with a 2.8 percent higher growth rate of construction sector real value added. In contrast, the coefficient of –0.233 on the interaction term with financial openness indicates that a 1 percentage point greater de-facto openness during contractions is associated with a 0.2 percent lower growth rate of construction sector real value added. The economic significance of these offsetting effects depends not only on the elasticities, but also on the average values of each variable, as discussed later in the text.
[16] By construction, the points associated with the sole impact of financial openness form a straight line, as they represent regression coefficients scaled by the values of the variable on the horizontal axis.

reserves and other explanatory variables fixed at zero. The inclusion of reserves diminishes the negative association with financial openness significantly. In all cases, accounting for foreign exchange reserve holdings of each country during a contraction episode shifts the curve upward and reduces the slope, indicating a dampening effect. For the less sensitive sectors (manufacturing along with wholesale and retail), reserves alone offset the negative effect of financial openness on average. However, the contribution of reserves, while significantly positive, is not enough to eliminate the negative impact of financial openness as the propagation mechanism in the most sensitive sectors of construction and transportation. For instance, taking the case of Argentina in 1989 (with total foreign financial assets and liabilities summing to approximately 130 percent of GDP), its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves is estimated to have reduced the decline in the construction industry from over 30 to less than 10 percent. Similar observations, albeit of differing magnitude, can be made regarding other financial contraction episodes.

The economic literature on sudden stops was motivated by the 1994 Mexican crisis, with episodes of sudden stops subsequently identified for many emerging market economies going back to the 1980s, the period of substantial cross-border private capital flow liberalization. The link between sudden stops and output loss has also been extensively investigated in recent years. In particular, consistent with the short-run dynamics between financial contractions and drops in real sector value added growth rates identified in this paper, Hutchison and Noy (2006) find that sudden-stop crises have a large but short-lived negative effect on output over and above that of currency crises. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) attribute the link between sudden stops and output collapses to the credit channel, whereby abrupt stops in foreign capital inflows cause local credit markets to dry up, thus reducing investment and domestic demand. A related channel, emphasized by Mendoza (2001), concerns the combined effect of sudden stops and currency crises, whereby the deterioration of collateral in the financial sector causes debt deflation followed by real contraction. Against this theoretical backdrop, our regression results identify industries most susceptible to credit contractions and deteriorations in financial collateral values induced by a sudden stop. The construction sector appears the most sensitive, followed by transportation (which also includes the highly credit-based shipping industry), wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing. The sensitivity of the construction sector is consistent with existing work, such as Borio and Drehmann (2009), which suggests that property prices have early warning properties in the context of predicting banking crises and financial busts.

Figure 4 [about here]

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To check the stability of the relationship, we conduct 10-year rolling regressions based on Equation (4). Figure 4 plots partial impact of financial openness and foreign exchange reserve holdings on the value added growth rate of the same four sectors. The partial impact is calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient on the linear and the interaction term of openness and reserves with financial shocks in each year (i.e. based on a panel from time period *t-10* to *t*) by their cross-sectional average. For illustrative purposes we focus on the period around the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. Since the rolling regressions are based on a backward-looking 10-year window, point estimates shown in Figure 4 reflect the coefficients capturing the average relationship in the preceding period. Hence, point estimates may reflect actual developments with a lag. Nevertheless, the plots confirm the negative effect of financial openness during financial sector contraction episodes and the mitigating effect of foreign exchange reserve holdings. Further, the differences in scales between the four panels show that construction sector is the most sensitive. The time-series dynamics of partial effects also suggest that construction sector responds not only with grater magnitude, but faster than other sectors, during both bust and recovery periods.

Given the complex non-linear associations between financial contractions and real sector growth rates, we repeat the exercise of interacting financial contraction dummies with financial openness and foreign exchange reserves focusing only on the right-hand side of the distribution of financial contraction episodes, i.e., really big contractions.

In order to examine the impact of particularly large contractions, we reclassify as contractions only those episodes in which the fall in the growth rate of financial sector real value added exceeded the median of all contractions in absolute value (those exceeding the sample median of a –9.34 percent drop in financial sector real value added over one year). As the results in Table 12 show, the negative impact of financial openness and the offsetting positive effect of the stock of foreign exchange reserves are magnified during particularly large financial contraction episodes. In the construction sector regressions, the coefficient on the interaction of financial contraction with financial openness is –0.66 (compared to –0.23 when all negative structural breaks in financial growth are counted as contractions as in Table 9). Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction of financial contraction with the reserves-to-GDP ratio is 0.083 (compared to 0.028 in the unrestricted specification). A similar pattern is observed for other sensitive sectors (manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation), with the coefficient on the interaction terms doubling or tripling in absolute value.

Table 12 [about here]

5. Conclusion and future research

Our empirical study validates the asymmetric nature of the link between financial sector growth and growth in the real economy. Abrupt financial contractions are more likely to take place following periods of accelerated growth in the financial sector – the higher the growth rate of financial sector value added relative to the non-financial sectors, the greater its power in predicting subsequent financial busts. Furthermore, financial contractions are associated with a large decline in the value added of key real sectors, with the construction sector affected the most, even though financial expansions do not seem to have much of an effect. This asymmetric feature was pointed out previously by Philippon (2008) for the U.S., and we find that it applies more universally to a large number of developing and developed countries. Hence, policymakers, and particularly those from emerging markets, can benefit by taking into account the factors magnifying and mitigating their countries' exposure to costly financial contractions.

For this latter group of countries, we find that the adverse effects of abrupt financial contractions are magnified by financial openness and mitigated by international reserves. Remarkably, 9 out of the 12 post-1980 financial contraction episodes were identified as sudden stops in capital flows, and all, except for Sweden in 1992, happened in emerging markets. This demonstrated vulnerability to financial shocks via capital account openness finds its echo in the prevalent self-insurance trend among emerging markets. As the growing financial integration of the last two decades exposed them to the risk of sudden stops and capital flight crises, emerging markets accumulated an unprecedented amount of international reserves to serve as a financial buffer in turbulent times (see Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010); Aizenman and Pinto (2011) review the policy lessons). We stop short, however, of analyzing the more recent macroprudential, self-insurance, and international liquidity assistance mechanisms that have been used in response to the global financial crisis or are in the process of being implemented (see CGFS (2010, 2011)). Some of these tools can serve as possible substitutes to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and their drawdown during crises (see, for example, McCauley (2012) on the official use of foreign exchange swap markets during the recent global financial crisis), but their use falls outside of the time period covered by our sample. We thus leave an analysis of the effectiveness of these policy measures to future research. Our analysis can also be extended in other ways. With more detailed data, one would be able to evaluate the contribution of financial accelerations and contractions to the productivity of the economy. Building on Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), who provide evidence that the impact is highly non-linear, there is a need to identify more precisely the conditions under which too rapid expansion of financial intermediation is inefficient and may be destabilizing to the real economy.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Pairwise correlations of value added growth rates for the 9 sectors.

	Finance	Agriculture	Construction	Government	Mining	Manufacturing	Public utilities	Transportation
Agriculture	0.0533*	1						
	(0.0444)							
Construction	0.6573*	0.1091*	1					
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)						
Government	0.2544*	0.1084*	0.2766*	1				
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)					
Mining	0.039	0.0419	0.0861*	0.1039*	1			
	(0.1410)	(0.1143)	(0.0012)	(0.0001)				
Manufacturing	0.1699*	0.1537*	0.4036*	0.3125*	0.1745*	1		
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)			
Public utilities	0.8433*	0.0284	0.5896*	0.2001*	0.0723*	0.2069*	1	
	(0.0000)	(0.2838)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	0.0064	(0.0000)		
Transportation	-0.1583*	0.1147*	0.1195*	0.2897*	0.1018*	0.5314*	-0.1714*	
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	
Wholesale, retail	-0.4761*	0.0918*	-0.0777*	0.3582*	0.1084*	0.4539*	-0.4989*	0.6070*
	(0.0000)	(0.0005)	(0.0034)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)

Notes: * indicates correlation coefficients significant at the 10 percent level or higher, p-values in parentheses. The highest degree of contemporaneous correlation is observed between public utilities and the financial sector followed by construction and the financial sector (with correlation coefficients of 0.84 and 0.66 respectively).

Table 2: Granger-causality regressions between the cyclical component of financial sector value added and the non-financial sector.

Dep. Var.: CF(Non-fin. Value added)	Levels		First differences	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lag CF(Fin. Value added)	-0.048*	-0.048**		
	(0.024)	(0.022)		
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added)	0.788***	0.788***		
	(0.039)	(0.030)		
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added)			-0.033***	-0.033
			(0.012)	(0.028)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added)			0.593***	0.593***
			(0.026)	(0.038)
Constant	0.005***	0.172***	0.000***	0
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Fixed effects	yes	no	yes	no
Country dummies	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	1,423	1,423	1,395	1,395
R-squared	0.467	0.491	0.256	0.257
Number of countries	28		28	

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it to range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years.

Table 3: Summary statistics for yr/yr % chng. in value added (1995 prices) of financial sector.

Country	Mean	Max	Min.	Std. Dev	Skew.	Kurt.	Obs.
Argentina	0.022	0.185	-0.220	0.076	-0.382	4.255	55
Bolivia	0.038	0.347	-0.405	0.118	-0.615	5.782	55
Brazil	0.054	0.231	-0.084	0.065	0.159	2.801	55
Chile	0.050	0.650	-0.835	0.172	-1.833	16.186	55
Colombia	0.061	0.247	-0.152	0.070	-0.404	5.097	55
Costa Rica	0.061	0.341	-0.550	0.120	-2.204	14.817	55
Denmark	0.040	0.140	-0.034	0.032	0.763	4.240	58
France	0.039	0.101	-0.008	0.028	0.561	2.350	55
Germany	0.060	0.116	0.025	0.023	0.565	2.503	41
Hong Kong SAR, China	0.068	0.189	-0.070	0.061	-0.132	3.126	31
India	0.081	0.195	-0.100	0.059	-0.568	3.375	55
Indonesia	0.095	0.542	-0.284	0.131	-0.209	6.926	43
Italy	0.034	0.071	-0.007	0.020	-0.092	2.149	54
Japan	0.068	0.358	-0.191	0.079	0.550	7.044	51
Korea, Rep.	0.047	0.131	-0.075	0.041	-0.347	3.308	52
Malaysia	0.112	0.550	-0.019	0.092	3.071	15.946	35
Mexico	0.060	0.148	-0.084	0.048	-0.417	3.768	55
Netherlands	0.050	0.253	-0.031	0.043	2.443	12.883	45
Peru	0.050	0.222	-0.117	0.062	0.336	4.364	55
Philippines	0.047	0.148	-0.216	0.077	-1.588	6.415	34
Singapore	0.090	0.171	-0.026	0.048	-0.347	2.303	45
Spain	0.044	0.142	-0.018	0.035	0.524	3.192	58
Sweden	0.031	0.065	-0.028	0.016	-1.008	5.808	55
Taiwan	0.095	0.261	-0.025	0.069	0.280	2.509	44
Thailand	0.093	0.437	-0.399	0.144	-1.073	6.074	54
United Kingdom	0.034	0.090	-0.011	0.021	0.226	2.961	58
United States	0.042	0.070	0.000	0.015	-0.707	3.560	58
Venezuela, RB	0.049	0.332	-0.359	0.117	-0.341	4.888	55

Notes: The table shows summary statistics for real value added growth rates (calculated as log differences of dollar amounts at 1995 prices) for each country for the financial sector. Note that the GGDC 10-Industry Database includes insurance and real estate services in the financial sector. The mean growth rate for each country is positive; however, the series for 17 out of the 28 countries exhibit negative skewness. Furthermore, the average level of kurtosis is higher for countries with negative skew in the series (6.619 compared to 5.527). Combined, the summary statistics indicate fat tails and higher frequency of occurrences of sudden declines in financial sector value added than predicted by a symmetric normal distribution, corroborating the notion that the financial industry, while growing in the long run, is subject to abrupt periodic contractions.

Table 4: Higher financial sector growth as a determinant of future contractions.

dependent variable: *LARGE* financial contractions	Probit		Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
lag dlog(value added fin.)-dlog(GDP), 3-yr. avg.	0.306**	0.297**	0.744***	0.717***
	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.260)	(0.265)
currencycrisis	1.410***	1.376***	3.667***	3.472***
	(0.273)	(0.267)	(0.737)	(0.810)
lag log(govt spending)		0.804*		1.438
		(0.471)		(1.315)
Constant	-2.907***	-5.176***	-6.298***	-10.257***
	(0.215)	(1.274)	(0.691)	(3.427)
Pseudo R2	0.222	0.243	0.221	0.232
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
lag dlog(value added fin.)-dlog(GDP), 5-yr. avg.	0.256*	0.247*	0.625**	0.601**
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.255)	(0.265)
currencycrisis	1.407***	1.373***	3.656***	3.462***
	(0.273)	(0.268)	(0.738)	(0.811)
lag log(govt spending)		0.804*		1.441
		(0.470)		(1.313)
Constant	-2.904***	-5.173***	-6.289***	-10.256***
	(0.216)	(1.272)	(0.691)	(3.422)
Pseudo R2	0.220	0.242	0.220	0.231
Clustering by country	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1,119	1,089	1,119	1,089

Notes: Probit and logit regression estimation results with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Banking crisis dummy excluded from the control vector because it predicts outcomes perfectly. The top panel calculates the excess of the financial sector growth rate relative to GDP using 3-year averages while the bottom panel uses 5-year averages.

Table 5: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions –
structural breaks – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors.

dependent var.: value added	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
lag financial contraction	-0.028*	-0.119***	-0.020	-0.030*	-0.005	-0.029*	-0.032**
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)
lag financial expansion	-0.008	0.021	-0.012	0.013	0.014	0.011	0.013*
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
convergence (value added pe	-0.017**	-0.022*	-0.022***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.017***	-0.039***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
banking crisis	-0.012	-0.026	0.004	-0.029***	-0.032***	-0.018*	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)
currency crisis	-0.003	-0.028*	0.005	-0.014*	-0.012	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
log(gdp/cap)	0.013***	0.015*	-0.003	-0.006	-0.011**	0.002	0.007*
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
wdi_credit	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(inflation)	-0.004**	-0.012***	-0.005	-0.010***	-0.002	-0.009***	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log(govt spending)	-0.008	-0.035	0.005	-0.019*	-0.019	-0.017*	-0.021**
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)
de-jure financial openness	0.005	0.006	0.008	-0.004	0.010	-0.001	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
log(trade openness)	-0.019**	-0.039**	0.009	0.004	0.005	-0.007	0.018**
lagged value added growth:	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
agriculture	-0.284***	-0.068	0.048	-0.019	0.014	0.033	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)
construction	0.010	0.136***	0.009	-0.002	0.034	-0.009	0.023
	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.017)
government	0.002	0.018	-0.011	-0.004	0.011	0.004	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)
mining	-0.009	-0.003	0.169***	-0.003	0.014	-0.009	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
manufacturing	0.115**	0.061	-0.034	0.197***	0.067	0.136***	0.109***
	(0.049)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.041)
public utilities	-0.014	0.004	-0.079	-0.003	-0.050	0.025	0.013
	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.026)
transportation	-0.039	0.167*	-0.007	-0.087*	-0.073	-0.050	0.062
	(0.049)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)
wholesale, retail	-0.023	0.185*	-0.051	-0.011	0.024	0.099**	0.038
	(0.052)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Constant	0.084**	0.276***	0.132*	0.270***	0.326***	0.193***	0.146***
	(0.040)	(0.091)	(0.078)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.034)
Observations	911	911	911	911	911	911	911
R-squared	0.105	0.170	0.061	0.240	0.214	0.189	0.173
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Financial contractions (expansions) defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of the financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative (positive) growth rate.

Table 6: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – turning points in the cyclical component – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors.

dependent var.: value added growth rate	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
lag financial contraction	0.003	-0.020**	-0.028***	-0.009**	-0.009*	-0.014***	-0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
lag financial expansion	-0.002	0.019**	-0.009	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
convergence (value added per worker)	-0.017**	-0.026**	-0.022***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.016***	-0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
banking crisis	-0.013	-0.020	0.002	-0.027**	-0.030**	-0.016	-0.007
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
currency crisis	-0.004	-0.032**	0.003	-0.015**	-0.013	-0.009	-0.011*
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
log(gdp/cap)	0.013***	0.014*	-0.003	-0.007	-0.011**	0.001	0.007*
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
wdi_credit	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(inflation)	-0.005***	-0.013***	-0.005	-0.011***	-0.003	-0.009***	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log(govt spending)	-0.008	-0.031	0.009	-0.018	-0.018	-0.015	-0.019**
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)
de-facto financial openness	0.005	0.003	0.007	-0.005	0.009	-0.002	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
log(trade openness)	-0.018*	-0.036**	0.010	0.006	0.005	-0.006	0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
lagged value added growth:							
agriculture	-0.281***	-0.071	0.042	-0.021	0.010	0.029	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)
construction	0.009	0.137***	0.017	0.000	0.035*	-0.006	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.017)
government	0.002	0.016	-0.014	-0.005	0.010	0.003	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)
mining	-0.008	-0.001	0.173***	-0.002	0.014	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
manufacturing	0.122**	0.045	-0.039	0.188***	0.057	0.126***	0.108***
	(0.049)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.041)
public utilities	-0.012	0.021	-0.071	0.002	-0.047	0.031	0.017
	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.026)
transportation	-0.033	0.174*	-0.007	-0.088*	-0.077	-0.051	0.062
	(0.049)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)
wholesale, retail	-0.023	0.187*	-0.064	-0.010	0.024	0.097**	0.036
	(0.053)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.044)
Constant	0.078**	0.280***	0.123	0.270***	0.329***	0.188***	0.143***
	(0.040)	(0.091)	(0.077)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.034)
Observations	911	911	911	911	911	911	911
R-squared	0.102	0.164	0.070	0.241	0.217	0.195	0.168
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it to range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years.

Table 7: Percentage shares of real value added within the total non-government, real economy sectors during financial contraction episodes.

Year	Country	Agriculture	Construction	Mining	Manufacturing	Public Utilities	Wholesale, Retail	Transportation
1951	United Kingdom	3.03%	9.38%	12.43%	40.58%	1.87%	23.11%	9.59%
1956	Colombia	33.10%	10.02%	4.96%	20.98%	1.82%	19.71%	9.41%
1959	Costa Rica	28.59%	7.33%	0.13%	23.61%	1.85%	31.70%	6.79%
1960	Venezuela	4.49%	9.07%	54.86%	12.70%	0.29%	14.87%	3.72%
1973	India	53.05%	6.46%	2.17%	16.32%	1.49%	14.31%	6.20%
1975	Sweden	7.53%	10.49%	1.09%	41.03%	4.05%	24.01%	11.80%
1979	Bolivia	20.37%	7.64%	17.00%	28.56%	1.64%	15.27%	9.51%
1981	Chile	7.89%	15.91%	11.42%	33.35%	4.61%	18.39%	8.43%
1982	Bolivia	22.84%	5.77%	18.24%	24.40%	2.12%	15.84%	10.79%
1982	Chile	9.15%	14.21%	14.21%	30.81%	5.39%	17.49%	8.74%
1982	Taiwan	9.58%	7.52%	2.80%	46.35%	2.83%	22.50%	8.42%
1983	Philippines	26.98%	13.10%	1.72%	32.42%	2.94%	16.74%	6.09%
1983	Chile	9.12%	12.40%	14.18%	32.35%	5.72%	17.62%	8.62%
1985	Malaysia	25.52%	6.53%	16.81%	23.15%	3.20%	16.50%	8.29%
1988	Bolivia	24.22%	4.60%	13.51%	24.36%	2.34%	17.64%	13.34%
1989	Argentina	10.09%	9.53%	2.63%	33.50%	3.30%	28.63%	12.32%
1992	Sweden	6.24%	10.29%	0.70%	37.21%	6.63%	22.89%	16.04%
1997	Indonesia	17.24%	9.49%	13.60%	32.18%	0.56%	21.19%	5.75%
2000	Argentina	9.83%	9.37%	3.20%	28.76%	4.80%	28.61%	15.43%

Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.

Table 8: Estimated cumulative effect of financial contractions on total non-financial sector value added growth.

Year	Country	Fin. Cont. Size	Comulative imact	
			Dummy effect only	Proportional to size
1973	India	-10.02%	-3.31%	-2.32%
1975	Sweden	-0.59%	-4.29%	-0.18%
1979	Bolivia	-1.15%	-3.36%	-0.27%
1981	Chile	-7.16%	-4.47%	-2.23%
1982	Bolivia	-18.64%	-3.06%	-3.98%
1982	Chile	-83.53%	-4.15%	-24.19%
1982	Taiwan	-1.73%	-3.97%	-0.48%
1983	Philippines	-21.59%	-4.34%	-6.54%
1983	Chile	-20.73%	-3.96%	-5.72%
1985	Malaysia	-1.86%	-3.12%	-0.41%
1988	Bolivia	-1.97%	-3.07%	-0.42%
1989	Argentina	-5.48%	-4.10%	-1.57%
1992	Sweden	-2.82%	-4.19%	-0.82%
1997	Indonesia	-28.37%	-3.75%	-7.42%
2000	Argentina	-9.34%	-3.99%	-2.60%

Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate. The partial cumulative effect of financial contraction on the real economy total is calculated as the sum of cumulative effects in individual sectors weighted by each sector's value added shares (see Table 10).

Table 9: Contraction episodes in financial sector growth rates

Year	Country	Contraction	Banking Crisis	Source:	Currency Crisis	Source:	Sudden Stop	Source:
1951	United Kingdom	0.00%						
1956	Colombia	-13.54%						
1959	Costa Rica	-55.01%		Most countries in the sample, except for U.K. and Sweden, closed				
1960	Venezuela	-35.94%		to private capital flows in the pre-1980 period.				
1973	India	-10.02%						
1975	Sweden	-0.59%	X (1974)	L-V	X (1977)	C-R		
1979	Bolivia	-1.15%						
1981	Chile	-7.16%	X	L-V		C-R	X	C-R
1982	Bolivia	-18.64%			X	C-R		
1982	Chile	-83.53%			X	C-R, L-V	X	C-R
1982	Taiwan	-1.73%						
1983	Philippines	-21.59%	X	L-V	X	C-R	X	H-N
1983	Chile	-20.73%			X (1984)	C-R	X	C-R
1985	Malaysia	-1.86%	X	C-R	X	C-R	X	H-N
1988	Bolivia	-1.97%	X (1986, 1987)	L-V, C-R				
1989	Argentina	-5.48%	X	L-V	X (1990)	C-R	X (1991)	C-R
1992	Sweden	-2.82%	X (1991)	C-B-T	X	C-R	X	C-I-M
1997	Indonesia	-28.37%	X	L-V	X	C-R	X	C-I-M
2000	Argentina	-9.34%	X (2001)	L-V			X	C-I-M

Notes: Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate. The shorthand for the sources is as follows. L-V: Laeven and Valencia (2012); C-R: Calvo and Reinhart (2000); D-B-T: Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012); H-N: Hutchison and Noy (2006); C-I-M: Calvo, Izquierdo, Mejia (2004).

Table 10: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – structural breaks – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors; pre- and post-1980 subsamples.

Structural break method	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
dependent var.: value added	agriculture	construction	mining	manufacturing	public utilities	wholesale, retail	transportation
			Pre-1980				
lag financial contraction	-0.028	-0.011	-0.012	-0.002	-0.002	0.025	0.022
	(0.038)	(0.060)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.033)
lag financial expansion	-0.006	0.008	0.005	-0.005	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.011)
banking crisis	0.060	-0.103*	0.032	-0.006	-0.028	-0.009	0.015
	(0.038)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.033)
currency crisis	-0.001	-0.034	0.034	-0.008	-0.006	-0.002	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Observations	335	335	335	335	335	335	335
R-squared	0.112	0.169	0.053	0.220	0.144	0.198	0.134
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
			Post-1980				
lag financial contraction	-0.033*	-0.131***	-0.028	-0.036*	-0.005	-0.040**	-0.054***
	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)
lag financial expansion	-0.006	0.019	-0.016	0.022	0.012	0.003	0.012
	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)
banking crisis	-0.018	-0.014	-0.004	-0.028**	-0.036***	-0.016	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
currency crisis	-0.001	-0.025	0.002	-0.013	-0.017**	-0.006	-0.011*
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Observations	554	554	554	554	554	554	554
R-squared	0.133	0.173	0.169	0.168	0.106	0.184	0.258
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.

Table 11: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial contractions on sectoral real value added growth rates, controlling for financial openness and reserve accumulation.

dependent var.: value added growth	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
Baseline							
Lag financial contraction	-0.029	-0.014	0.002	-0.018	0.025	0.053	0.046
	(0.038)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Financial openness	-0.018*	-0.024	0.022	0.006	-0.007	-0.012	0.019**
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness	-0.010	-0.207***	-0.082	-0.086**	-0.036	-0.077**	-0.143***
	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.001*	0.000	0.001***	-0.000	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	0.001	0.017**	0.009	0.011**	0.001	0.001	0.010***
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	773	773	773	773	773	773	773
R-squared	0.110	0.182	0.109	0.199	0.135	0.159	0.216
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Additional controls							
Lag financial contraction	-0.036	-0.056	-0.020	-0.053	0.067	-0.023	0.079*
	(0.071)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Financial openness	-0.002	0.022	0.057*	0.061***	0.010	-0.000	0.041***
	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness	0.007	-0.241***	-0.072	-0.098**	-0.065*	-0.117***	-0.147***
	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.001	-0.000	0.002***	0.000	0.001***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	-0.003	0.030**	0.015	0.020***	0.001	0.020***	0.010**
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.126	0.184	0.122	0.228	0.136	0.239	0.307
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.

Table 12: Panel regressions of the effect of LARGE sharp financial contractions (above the median in absolute value) on sectoral real value added growth rates, controlling for financial openness and reserve accumulation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
dependent var.: value added growth rate	agriculture	construction	mining	manufacturing	public utilities	wholesale, retail	transportation
Baseline							
Lag financial contraction	-0.022	-0.051	-0.024	-0.038	-0.010	-0.027	0.047
	(0.050)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.040)
Financial openness	-0.022**	-0.026	0.026	0.010	-0.007	-0.009	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness	0.090	-0.518***	-0.025	-0.203***	-0.020	-0.339***	-0.221***
	(0.059)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.046)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.001	0.000	0.001***	-0.000	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	-0.028**	0.088***	-0.002	0.037***	0.001	0.070***	0.027***
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Observations	773	773	773	773	773	773	773
R-squared	0.123	0.192	0.109	0.209	0.135	0.196	0.218
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Additional controls							
Lag financial contraction	-0.144	0.318	-0.039	0.076	0.105	0.194**	0.208***
	(0.105)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.068)
Financial openness	0.002	0.032	0.055	0.063***	0.010	0.004	0.045***
	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Lag fin. contraction × fin. openness	0.182**	-0.748***	-0.033	-0.274***	-0.089	-0.461***	-0.303***
	(0.087)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.057)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.001	-0.000	0.002***	0.000	0.001***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	-0.035***	0.091***	0.005	0.038***	0.002	0.070***	0.024***
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.144	0.206	0.120	0.239	0.135	0.289	0.320
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by a 9.34 percent (sample median) or greater contraction.

Figure 1: Argentina SAMPLE – Financial sector value added-to-GDP ratio (top panel), structural breaks in the growth rate (center panel), and cyclical components of total financial and non-financial sector value added (bottom panel).

Figure 2: The figure shows the empirical distribution of financial sector real value added growth rates plotted against a normal distribution fit. The average level of kurtosis is higher for countries with negative skew in the series (6.619 compared to 5.527), and this difference shows up in bigger deviations from the normal distribution (Gaussian bell curve) in the tails for the subsample of countries with negative skew.

Figure 3: Predicted contribution of financial openness and reserves to real sector growth during financial contractions. Predicted real value added growth calculated by multiplying regression coefficients in the full specification in Table 9 by the values of explanatory variables during each financial contraction episode.

Figure 4: Partial effects of financial openness and reserves on the growth of selected sectors around the Asian financial crisis. Estimates based on 10-year window rolling regressions of Equation (4); coefficients on linear and interaction terms with financial contractions in year t multiplied by cross-section average of financial openness and international reserves.

Appendix

Table A1: Country-level Granger-causality regressions between the cyclical component of financial sector value added and the non-financial sector. Top panel in levels; bottom panel in first differences.

Country	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHL	COL	CRI	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	HKG	IDN	IND
Lag CF(Fin. Value added)	-0.137***	-0.051***	0.075	0.039	0.018	0.094***	0.105	-0.189***	-0.198***	0.038	0.050	0.106***	-0.088**	-0.671***
	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.078)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.192)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.166)
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added)	0.888***	0.900***	0.719***	0.712***	0.811***	0.617***	0.526***	0.656***	0.990***	0.473***	0.489***	0.345**	0.919***	2.685***
	(0.098)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.121)	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.616)
Constant	-0.006	-0.004	-0.007*	-0.009	-0.007*	-0.008*	0.253***	0.222***	0.076***	-0.012***	0.209***	-0.524***	0.008	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.123)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55	41	58	58	55	58	31	45	55
R-squared	0.637	0.726	0.639	0.571	0.667	0.605	0.579	0.648	0.766	0.489	0.530	0.269	0.413	0.330

| Country	ITA	JPN	KOR	MEX	MYS	NLD	PER	PHL	SGP	SWE	THA	TWN	USA	VEN
Lag CF(Fin. Value added)	0.139	0.016	-0.163	-0.323***	-0.126	0.067	0.016	-0.158*	-0.271***	-0.281**	-0.042	-0.059**	-0.899***	0.086*
	(0.100)	(0.032)	(0.111)	(0.058)	(0.091)	(0.051)	(0.158)	(0.085)	(0.060)	(0.134)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.171)	(0.044)
Lag CF(Non-fin. Value added)	0.494***	0.652***	0.809***	0.951***	0.876***	0.517***	0.713***	1.018***	1.031***	0.703***	0.928***	0.641***	0.943***	0.697***
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.144)	(0.072)	(0.206)	(0.166)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.097)	(0.114)	(0.093)	(0.085)
Constant	-0.009***	-0.157***	-0.218***	-0.008***	-0.009	0.015***	-0.006	-0.005	0.006*	-0.014***	-0.002	0.015***	0.442***	-0.007
	(0.003)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.060)	(0.005)
Observations	54	51	52	55	35	45	55	34	45	55	54	44	58	55
R-squared	0.437	0.619	0.559	0.738	0.643	0.568	0.535	0.648	0.768	0.695	0.698	0.441	0.628	0.633

Country	ARG	BOL	BRA	CHL	COL	CRI	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	HKG	IDN	IND
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added)	-0.170**	-0.104***	0.240**	-0.011	0.005	0.088***	0.181	-0.039	-0.188***	-0.019	-0.090	0.105*	-0.045	-0.184
	(0.080)	(0.024)	(0.094)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.217)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.121)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.134)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added)	0.710***	0.755***	0.583***	0.711***	0.767***	0.471***	0.319**	0.477***	0.886***	0.406***	0.386***	0.248	0.534**	1.278***
	(0.131)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.141)	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.070)	(0.107)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.162)	(0.259)	(0.436)
Constant	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.005	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Observations	54	54	54	54	54	54	40	57	57	54	57	30	44	54
R-squared	0.376	0.521	0.518	0.441	0.516	0.363	0.246	0.402	0.519	0.291	0.290	0.138	0.123	0.101
Durbin-Watson	1.274	0.878	0.628	0.796	0.693	0.974	1.387	0.944	1.073	1.196	1.082	1.289	1.032	1.010

Country	ITA	JPN	KOR	MEX	MYS	NLD	PER	PHL	SGP	SWE	THA	TWN	USA	VEN
Lag Change in CF(Fin. Value added)	0.268**	0.071**	-0.019	-0.340***	-0.158*	-0.004	-0.002	-0.307**	-0.221**	-0.394***	-0.081***	-0.081**	-0.855***	0.040
	(0.100)	(0.027)	(0.192)	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.038)	(0.159)	(0.082)	(0.127)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.154)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Lag Change in CF(Non-fin. Value added)	0.400***	0.528***	0.426***	0.800***	0.697***	0.450***	0.626***	1.224***	0.747***	0.510***	0.842***	0.480***	0.722***	0.508***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.143)	(0.103)	(0.145)	(0.084)	(0.198)	(0.295)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.099)	(0.137)
Constant	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Observations	53	50	51	54	34	44	54	33	44	54	53	43	57	54
R-squared	0.370	0.474	0.178	0.539	0.424	0.409	0.395	0.517	0.537	0.427	0.503	0.298	0.437	0.270
Durbin-Watson	0.858	0.932	1.322	1.093	1.122	0.854	0.916	0.830	1.052	1.138	0.945	0.935	1.201	1.143

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it to range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years.

Table A2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Panel Unit Root Test Results

Method	Statistic	Prob.**
ADF - Fisher Chi-square	1010.22	0.0000
ADF - Choi Z-stat	-28.767	0.0000

Notes: Null hypothesis: unit root (individual unit root process). ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. Total of 1,388 observations with 28 cross-sections. The number of augmenting lags (p) is determined by minimizing the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion. Exogenous variables: individual effects. The p-values indicate that the null of unit root is strongly rejected, indicating that the financial sector growth series is stationary.

Table A3: Intermediate ADF test results for financial sector real value added growth rates.

Cross section	Prob.	Lag	Max Lag	Obs
Argentina	0.000	0	10	54
Bolivia	0.000	0	10	54
Brazil	0.000	0	10	54
Chile	0.000	0	10	54
Colombia	0.000	0	10	54
Costa Rica	0.000	0	10	54
Denmark	0.000	2	9	38
France	0.000	1	10	56
Germany	0.000	0	10	57
Hong Kong SAR, China	0.000	0	10	54
India	0.000	0	10	57
Indonesia	0.001	0	6	30
Italy	0.000	0	9	44
Japan	0.000	1	10	53
Korea, Rep.	0.000	0	10	53
Malaysia	0.000	0	10	50
Mexico	0.000	0	10	51
Netherlands	0.000	0	10	54
Peru	0.000	0	8	34
Philippines	0.000	0	9	44
Singapore	0.000	0	10	54
Spain	0.001	0	7	33
Sweden	0.005	0	9	44
Taiwan	0.000	1	10	53
Thailand	0.000	1	10	52
United Kingdom	0.000	0	9	43
United States	0.000	1	10	56
Venezuela, RB	0.000	0	10	54

Notes: Null hypothesis: unit root (individual unit root process). The number of augmenting lags (p) is determined by minimizing the Schwartz Bayesian information criterion. Exogenous variables: individual effects. The p-values indicate that the null of unit root is strongly rejected, indicating that the financial sector growth series is stationary.

Table A4: Panel unit root test results for industrial value added growth rates, $g_{i,t}$

Sector	ADF z-stat	p-value	lags	cross-section	obs.
Agriculture	-28.7669	0.000	2	28	1388
Construction	-19.1137	0.000	1	28	1390
Financial	-19.4258	0.000	6	28	1385
Manufacturing	-18.5692	0.000	2	28	1389
Mining	-21.3334	0.000	5	28	1387
Public utilities	-18.0808	0.000	5	28	1381
Transportation	-21.4824	0.000	1	28	1392
Wholesale, retail	-18.6194	0.000	3	28	1388

Notes: Null hypothesis: unit root in value added growth rate (individual unit root process); lag length selection based on SIC, 1947 to 2005 sample period, p-values based on Choi z-stat. Unit root also rejected at country-level tests; results omitted for brevity but available upon request.

Table A5: Cointegration test results between the determinants of the long-run level of real value added per worker and the current real value added per worker, $X_{k,t}$ and $\frac{Y}{L_{i,k,t-3}}$

Sector	Kao Residual Test		Johansen Fisher
	t-stat	p-value	p-value
Agriculture	-2.68661	0.004	0.0101
Construction	0.592721	0.277	0.0056
Financial	-0.80146	0.211	0.5082
Manufacturing	-2.11466	0.017	0.015
Mining	-2.03592	0.021	0.1131
Public utilities	-2.01041	0.022	0.2064
Transportation	-1.05302	0.146	0.0085
Wholesale, retail	-0.29118	0.386	0.0029

Notes: Null hypothesis: no cointegration; 5 lags selected based on SIC; Kao (1999) Residual Test assumes no deterministic trend with p-values based on residual ADF test; Johansen Fisher test conducted under the assumption of linear deterministic trend with p-values computed using asymptotic Chi-square distribution.

Table A6: Additional controls: the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – structural breaks – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors.

dependent var.: value added growth rate	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
lag financial contraction	-0.056***	-0.118***	-0.023	-0.037*	-0.007	-0.016	-0.046***
	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)
lag financial expansion	-0.010	0.013	-0.016	0.015	0.005	0.001	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
convergence (value added per worker)	-0.032**	-0.020	-0.054***	-0.023	-0.031***	-0.073***	-0.090***
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.012)
banking crisis	-0.001	-0.001	0.008	-0.013	-0.040***	-0.005	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
currency crisis	-0.001	-0.048**	-0.006	-0.019*	-0.025**	-0.009	-0.012*
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)
log(gdp/cap)	1.720*	4.089**	-1.982	-0.086	-0.101	3.771***	3.067***
	(0.935)	(1.760)	(1.609)	(0.956)	(0.846)	(0.834)	(0.658)
wdi_credit	-0.008	-0.059**	0.046*	-0.016	0.004	-0.031***	-0.010
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)
log(inflation)	-0.709**	-1.063*	-0.599	-1.515***	-0.203	-1.231***	-0.566***
	(0.307)	(0.581)	(0.563)	(0.283)	(0.279)	(0.263)	(0.205)
log(govt spending)	-1.112	-0.976	-6.881	-3.130	-1.471	-0.404	-5.062***
	(2.335)	(4.386)	(4.358)	(2.156)	(2.133)	(2.012)	(1.556)
de-facto financial openness	0.125	-1.652	1.753	-1.385	-0.546	-3.029**	-1.641
	(1.544)	(2.852)	(2.808)	(1.441)	(1.394)	(1.361)	(1.021)
log(trade openness)	0.205	0.954	5.169	5.677***	0.701	-0.404	3.456***
	(1.927)	(3.465)	(3.419)	(1.712)	(1.685)	(1.610)	(1.241)
lagged value added growth:							
agriculature	-0.277***	-0.038	-0.027	-0.022	0.032	0.032	-0.028
	(0.044)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.029)
construction	0.014	0.158***	0.033	-0.010	0.029	-0.015	0.022
	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.018)
government	0.006	0.029	-0.007	-0.009	0.002	0.002	0.014
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)
mining	-0.006	-0.023	0.067	-0.019	0.018	-0.016	-0.026*
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)
manufacturing	0.122*	0.142	-0.048	0.166***	-0.011	0.154***	0.159***
	(0.066)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.044)
public utilities	-0.038	0.195**	-0.056	0.053	-0.080*	0.058	0.009
	(0.049)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.033)
transportation	-0.039	0.036	-0.400***	-0.241***	-0.034	-0.143**	-0.078
	(0.074)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.050)
wholesale, retail	-0.026	0.078	0.119	0.067	0.071	0.028	0.031
	(0.074)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.050)
real interest rate	-0.025	0.004	0.082*	-0.006	0.007	-0.014	-0.019
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)
agricultural share of economy	0.277*	0.573**	0.113	0.412***	0.221*	0.318**	0.089
	(0.144)	(0.280)	(0.264)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.096)
industry share of economy	0.184*	0.297	0.244	0.212**	-0.028	0.138	-0.027
	(0.098)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.065)
political stability	-1.342	-2.629	0.187	-2.335	-0.066	1.226	2.100*
	(1.746)	(3.292)	(3.226)	(1.622)	(1.592)	(1.528)	(1.168)
rule of law	0.411	3.999	4.953	5.434**	2.206	-1.415	-3.887*
	(2.965)	(5.419)	(5.282)	(2.733)	(2.628)	(2.560)	(1.991)
regulatory quality	0.141	2.000	-1.099	0.552	1.050	2.972**	1.745*
	(1.401)	(2.551)	(2.474)	(1.323)	(1.233)	(1.316)	(0.960)
Constant	-0.064	-0.384	0.304	-0.091	0.207	-0.001	0.211**
	(0.141)	(0.267)	(0.259)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.096)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.116	0.166	0.120	0.194	0.129	0.203	0.266
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Financial contractions (expansions) defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative (positive) growth rate.

Table A7: Additional controls: the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – turning points in the cyclical component – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
dependent var.: value added growth ra	agriculture	construction	mining	manufacturing	public utilities	wholesale, retail	transportation
lag financial contraction	0.005	-0.026**	-0.030**	-0.013**	-0.004	-0.018***	-0.010**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
lag financial expansion	-0.001	0.026**	-0.008	0.010	0.012*	0.009	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
convergence (value added per worker)	-0.032**	-0.026	-0.055***	-0.025	-0.030***	-0.072***	-0.088***
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.012)
banking crisis	-0.001	0.002	0.006	-0.011	-0.040***	-0.005	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)
currency crisis	-0.004	-0.051**	-0.007	-0.019*	-0.025**	-0.009	-0.013*
	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)
log(gdp/cap)	0.017*	0.043**	-0.020	0.000	-0.001	0.037***	0.030***
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
wdi_credit	-0.000	-0.001**	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(inflation)	-0.008**	-0.011*	-0.005	-0.015***	-0.002	-0.012***	-0.006***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log(govt spending)	-0.012	-0.008	-0.063	-0.030	-0.015	-0.002	-0.049***
	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.016)
de-facto financial openness	-0.002	-0.024	0.014	-0.017	-0.006	-0.032**	-0.019*
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)
log(trade openness)	0.003	0.010	0.054	0.057***	0.007	-0.003	0.035***
lagged value added growth:	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)
agriculature	-0.271***	-0.038	-0.030	-0.022	0.028	0.028	-0.027
	(0.044)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.029)
construction	0.008	0.135**	0.028	-0.018	0.026	-0.020	0.015
	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.018)
government	0.005	0.023	-0.012	-0.011	0.002	-0.000	0.011
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)
mining	-0.008	-0.028	0.066	-0.020	0.017	-0.017	-0.028*
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.016)
manufacturing	0.133**	0.102	-0.059	0.147**	-0.027	0.131**	0.150***
	(0.067)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.045)
public utilities	-0.036	0.229**	-0.045	0.068	-0.073	0.070*	0.021
	(0.049)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.033)
transportation	-0.021	0.072	-0.388***	-0.231***	-0.034	-0.140**	-0.062
	(0.075)	(0.138)	(0.134)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.050)
wholesale, retail	-0.025	0.109	0.127	0.079	0.078	0.040	0.040
	(0.075)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.050)
real interest rate	-0.000	0.000	0.001**	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
agricultural share of economy	0.003*	0.006**	0.001	0.004***	0.002	0.003**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
industry share of economy	0.002*	0.003	0.002	0.002**	-0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
political stability	-0.013	-0.024	0.006	-0.023	-0.000	0.014	0.022*
	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)
rule of law	0.006	0.037	0.044	0.052*	0.022	-0.017	-0.039*
	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.020)
regulatory quality	-0.000	0.022	-0.010	0.007	0.011	0.030**	0.017*
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Constant	-0.053	-0.365	0.299	-0.089	0.207	-0.005	0.213**
	(0.142)	(0.266)	(0.258)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.096)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.104	0.166	0.129	0.198	0.137	0.224	0.260
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cyclical component identified using the band-pass filter suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) to log-levels of annual value added series in constant (1995) prices. In parameterizing the filtering procedure we set the range for cycle duration rather wide, allowing it to range from 2 years (lower bound of business cycle frequency) to 20 years.

Table A8: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial sector contractions and expansions – turning points in the cyclical component – on real value added growth rates of non-financial sectors; pre- and post-1980 subsamples.

Turning point method dependent var.: value added	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
Pre-1980							
lag financial contraction	-0.006	-0.009	-0.026	-0.004	-0.016*	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
lag financial expansion	-0.001	-0.007	-0.015	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
banking crisis	0.058	-0.107*	0.023	-0.007	-0.033	-0.010	0.014
	(0.038)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.033)
currency crisis	-0.001	-0.035	0.032	-0.009	-0.007	-0.002	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Observations	335	335	335	335	335	335	335
R-squared	0.111	0.171	0.062	0.221	0.150	0.193	0.131
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Post-1980							
lag financial contraction	0.009	-0.027**	-0.015	-0.013**	-0.003	-0.020***	-0.008*
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
lag financial expansion	-0.001	0.031**	-0.005	0.014**	0.011*	0.011*	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
banking crisis	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.023*	-0.034***	-0.014	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
currency crisis	-0.003	-0.032*	-0.000	-0.015*	-0.018**	-0.009	-0.014**
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Observations	554	554	554	554	554	554	554
R-squared	0.131	0.174	0.170	0.174	0.111	0.202	0.242
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.

Table A9: Panel regressions of the effect of sharp financial contractions on sectoral real value added growth rates, controlling for financial openness and reserve accumulation: comparison of magnifying effect external liabilities versus external assets.

dependent var.: value added growth rate	(1) agriculture	(2) construction	(3) mining	(4) manufacturing	(5) public utilities	(6) wholesale, retail	(7) transportation
Financial openness = external liabilities / GDP							
Lag financial contraction	-0.019	-0.069	-0.074	-0.081	0.058	-0.039	0.045
	(0.064)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.042)
external liabilities	-0.007	-0.036***	0.000	-0.003	0.002	0.004	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Lag fin. contraction × external liab.	-0.025	-0.263***	-0.042	-0.105**	-0.070	-0.141***	-0.157***
	(0.052)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.034)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.001	-0.000	0.002***	0.000	0.001***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	-0.001	0.027*	0.011	0.018***	0.000	0.020***	0.008*
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.128	0.196	0.116	0.210	0.135	0.239	0.292
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Financial openness = external assets / GDP							
Lag financial contraction	-0.080	-0.156	-0.051	-0.123**	0.048	-0.073	0.005
	(0.063)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.042)
external assets	-0.002	-0.041***	-0.005	-0.008	0.001	0.001	-0.008
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Lag fin. contraction × external assets	0.221*	-0.226	-0.199	-0.053	-0.120	-0.183*	-0.197**
	(0.119)	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.080)
Lag (reserves/gdp)	0.001**	0.002**	0.000	0.002***	0.001	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lag fin. contraction × (reserves/gdp)	-0.005	0.013	0.011	0.013**	-0.002	0.014**	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	551	551
R-squared	0.132	0.189	0.118	0.204	0.133	0.228	0.270
Number of countries	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on controls in each specification omitted for brevity. Financial contractions defined as structural breaks in the growth rate of value added of financial sector in each country (identified according to the Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) innovational outlier (IO) break unit-root test) followed by negative growth rate.